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Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The past year has seen widespread talk about a “credit
crunch” in the United States. The views of two groups have
dominated in thisdebate. One group argues we areexperienc-
ing a “credit crunch” right now and something needs to be
done about it; the other group argues that a “credit crunch”
cannot exist without major impediments to the achievement
of market equilibrium, that no such major impediments cur-
rently exist, and that what is happening now is merely a peri-
odic episode in which bank loans lag behind the business cy-
cle. The implication of this second argument is that the mar-
ket should be left to take care of itself.
One frustrating aspect of this debate is that people seem to
mean somewhat different things when they speak of a “credit
crunch.” The logic of the various positions would be clearer
if each position were developed within the framework of a
coherent model of how the credit-intermediation sector of the
economyoperates.Twosuchalternativemodelsalreadyexist:
a textbook-style model according to which the credit market
operates efficiently and a low level of lending activity is pre-
sumably a business cycle phenomenon driven by the demand
side of the market, and a liquidity-constraint model according
to which intermediaries impose nonprice constraints on their
customers with consequences that can be inefficient.1 In this
paper, we analyze a third alternative model of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation in which phenomena qualitatively resembling a
“credit crunch” occur but are efficient.
The deﬁnition of efficiency is key to the differences be-
tween our model and the two alternative models of intermedi-
ation just mentioned, and we examine it in detail later. First,
though, we want to outline the textbook-style and liquidity-
constraint models and then to describe our model of efficient
ﬁnancial-intermediation contracts that may involve nonprice
rationing in some circumstances.
Three “Credit Crunch” Perspectives
A “Credit Crunch” in Full Swing?...
We begin our examination of the prevailing views with the
perspective of those who think a “credit crunch” is already in
full swing. One person who has repeatedly suggested that a
situationofinefficientcreditrestraintisoccurringistheChair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan.2 His re-
marks to Congress over the last year have made it clear that
he believes something akin to a “credit crunch” now exists:
“The restraint on credit availability at depository institutions
represents a continuing clear risk to the outlook . . . . Banks
reportthattheyhavebeenapplyingmorestringentcreditstan-
dards and have made theprice and nonprice terms ofbusiness
credit less favorable to a wide range of customers. . . . In cer-
tain areas . . . the credit retrenchment appears to have gone
beyond a point of sensible balance.” (See Greenspan 1991b,
pp. 305–6 and 1991c, pp. 713–14.)
In his remarks to Congress, Chairman Greenspan (1991c,
pp. 713–14) has also identiﬁed the attitudes and actions of in-
termediaries he sees as contributing to this situation of credit
restraint:
In some cases, lender attitudes and actions have been character-
ized by excessive caution. As a result, there doubtless are credit-
worthy borrowers that are unable to access credit on reasonable
terms . . . . To an extent, the scarcity of some types of loans
may reﬂect the efforts of individual ﬁnancial institutions to re-
duce the share of their assets in a particular category, such as
commercial mortgages. While a single bank may be able to do
this without too much trouble, when the entire industry is trying
to make the same balance sheet adjustment, it simply cannot be
done without massive untoward effects.
Chairman Greenspan has taken pains to speak of “credit
restraint” rather than of a “credit crunch.” Nevertheless, in
three respects his view coincides with those who would say
that a “credit crunch” is now in full swing. First, allegedly a
situation currently exists in which those who are creditworthy
cannot get credit, or cannot get it at reasonable terms. Second,
lenders allegedly exhibit an attitude of excessive caution
which may or may not be traceable to regulatory distortion.3
Third, regardless of whether it is due to lenders’ mispercep-
tions or to regulatory distortions, the resulting inability of
would-be borrowers to fund their investment projects is alleg-
edly inefficient. The conclusion drawn by those who hold
such views is that regulatory changes that would provide in-
centives for lenders to relax their credit restrictions would
ameliorate this inefficiency. Chairman Greenspan (1991a, p.
246) has also drawn the connection to regulation in remarks
to Congress: “The Federal Reserve is working with the other
bank supervisory and regulatory agencies to ensure that bank
examination standards . . . do not artiﬁcially encourage or dis-
courage credit extension. The intent of these efforts is to con-




...O rJust Business Cycle Fluctuations?
Chairman Greenspan’s assessment of the credit situation is
not shared by all economists, however. The Shadow Open
Market Committee (a group of academic and business econ-
omists who regularly report on economic issues) offers a dif-
ferent evaluation of the same current market situation. In a
September 1991 press release, it claims that
the so-called credit crunch was a red herring. The recent drop in
business loans neither indicates a shortage of credit nor a refusal
by bankers to lend. To the contrary, banks are cutting loan rates
in an effort to drum up business. Bank loans (especially bank
loans to business) always lag behind the economic cycle.
Silas Keehn (1991, pp. 544, 546), President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, has offered a similar assessment in
the speciﬁc context of the Midwest. Like Chairman Green-
span, President Keehn uses the term credit restraint to de-
scribe the current state of the market. However, while Green-
span’s view of the lending market is that “credit retrenchment
appears to have gone beyond a point of sensible balance” and
may have “massive untoward effects,” Keehn considers the
situation to be a market adjustment that is beneﬁcial from a
long-term perspective:
What constitutes a credit “crunch,” to my way of thinking, is
when creditworthy borrowers, those that would normally ﬁnd it
possible to obtain credit even under adverse economic circum-
stances, cannot obtain ﬁnancing. This is not currently the case,
at least in the Midwest. . . . What currently exists is credit re-
straint—not a “crunch.”...T oconclude, it is my opinion that
the credit restraint that we are experiencing in the Midwest re-
ﬂects an adjustment in the marketplace, and it is entirely possi-
ble that we are coming to the end of this phase. . . . While in the
short run the credit restraint that we have been experiencing has
been difficult, particularly for those who have been denied
credit, in the long term the overall economy will beneﬁt from
this signiﬁcant transition.
Although these comments speciﬁcally concern the current
situation,theyargueintermsthatmanyeconomistswoulduse
to cast doubt on the general concept of a “credit crunch.”
These economists use two main textbook-style arguments.
One is that credit allocation must be viewed in the context of
a general theory of the business cycle. Economic models
based on rational expectations and competitive market-clear-
ing are appropriate for explaining the business cycle in the
United States. Such models do not accord any role to system-
atic misperceptions in determining allocation, and they implythat interest rate movements will equilibrate supply and de-
mand without recourse to rationing.
The second textbook-style argument these economists use
is that this equilibration process will produce an ex post effi-
cient resource allocation (that is, an allocation which is effi-
cient with respect to the preferences that agents would have
if they were fully informed about the state of the economy)
unless its operation is distorted by nonmarket forces, and the
current supervisory regulation of lenders is not the sort of in-
tervention that would produce such a distortion.
A Caveat: Is Credit Information Public?
If one accepts the thesis that a “credit crunch” sometimes oc-
curs, however, then one must reject at least one of these last
two arguments.4 Indeed, some economists do have doubts
about how well these two arguments apply to the credit mar-
kets to which consumers and all but the largest business turn
for credit. These doubts are based on three considerations.
First,thetwotextbook-styleargumentsabovereferimplic-
itly to a class of models in which all information held by vari-
ous economic agents is known to all of the agents (although
some information may not be known to anybody). In lending
markets, though, important information may be private. For
example, the owner of a business may have a fairly certain
assessment of its proﬁtability during the coming year but may
be unable to document this assessment to a bank.
Second, this privacy of information prevents lending mar-
ketsfromoperatinginthesameimpersonal,decentralizedway
that many other markets operate. In particular, credit allo-
cation often takes place in the context of a long-term relation-
ship between a borrower and a lender. As a result of the in-
formational problem, borrowers who are denied credit from
their speciﬁc lender may simply be unable to shop around for
another lender with any success.5
Third, this privacy of information and the resulting bilat-
eral, contractual aspect of credit markets is not represented in
thetextbook-stylecharacterizationoftheeconomyabove.Yet
the publicity of information is an important, implicit premise
in the second textbook-style argument that the market reaches
an equilibrium which is efficient. Thus, the presumption that
credit markets subject only to prudential regulation will attain
efficient outcomes cannot apply to the actual economy.
Thisthirdpoint issupportedprimafacie bysomeevidence
that credit allocation in the U.S. economy fails to conform to
the pattern that the textbook-style theory would predict. The
consumption pattern of low-wealth households seems to de-
part particularly far from the theoretical predictions. Some re-
searchers have found statistical evidence which suggests that
these households’ marginal propensity to consume is close to
unity. Moreover, there are some private information models
of lending that can explain this high marginal propensity to
consume and that have inefficient equilibria. (See Hayashi
1987.)
Soresearchfromtheliquidity-constraintperspectiveseems
to provide theoretical and statistical support for Chairman
Greenspan’s views. That is, there is some statistical evidence
againsttheviewthatdecentralizedinterestratecompetitional-
ways clears credit markets, and there are some models in
which such a failure of market clearing induces an inefficien-
cythatregulatoryormonetarypolicycouldpotentiallyamelio-
rate. A limitation of these models is that they do not explicitly
relate credit allocation to the business cycle, though.
Maybe in Full Swing, But Nevertheless Efficient
The alternative theory we present here can be characterized
bycomparisonwiththeviewsjustdiscussed.Incommonwith
the textbook-style theory and the liquidity-constraint theory,
we envision an economy of maximizing agents who have ra-
tional expectations. In common with the liquidity-constraint
theory, we suppose that these agents possess private informa-
tion which means that efficient allocation cannot be achieved
in a completely decentralized way. However, an implication
ofourtheoryisthattherequiredcentralizationcanbeachieved
by long-term contracting between agents and intermediaries.
Thus our theory implies, contrary to the liquidity-constraint
theory, that competition among intermediaries to provide en-
forceable long-term contracts leads to an efficient allocation.
Our concept of incentive-constrained, ex ante efficiency is
different from the efficiency concept to which the textbook-
style account of the equilibration process refers, though. Later
we will explain in detail this efficiency concept, which is
widely used for the welfare analysis of economies with pri-
vate information. (We will use the term efficiency to refer to
ex ante efficiency except where we explicitly indicate other-
wise.) The allocation we characterize as efficient is not sup-
ported by competitive adjustment of interest rates or other
prices. In this respect, our theory does not agree with the text-
book-style characterization of the economy.
The theory we present here can account for several phe-
nomena that Chairman Greenspan and others seem to have in
mind when they suggest that credit restraint has apparently
been inefficient. One of these phenomena is a cross-sectional
consumptionfunctionthatexhibitsmarginalpropensitytocon-
sume close to unity at low income levels. Another such phe-
nomenon is that the most favorably situated agents in the
economycouldachievehigherutilityfromanexpostperspec-
tive by making net trades at the interest rate envisioned in the
textbook-style theory (that is, at the rate determined by the
economy’smarginalrateofintertemporaltransformation)than
from accepting the commodity bundles that the ex ante effi-
cient allocation assigns to them.
In contrast to Chairman Greenspan’s apparent view, how-
ever, our theory does not support the interpretation of these
phenomena as symptoms of economic inefficiency. Our theo-
ry predicts that an efficient allocation will result when inter-
mediaries compete freely with one another to offer enforce-
able long-term contracts. The most direct implication of the
theoryforpolicyisthat nonmarketrestrictionsontheenforce-
ability of long-term contracts for ﬁnancial intermediation are
likely to prevent an efficient allocation from being attained. If
such restrictions are to be enforced for reasons that lie outside
the scope of our model, though, then potentially a role exists
forregulatorypolicy(andconceivablyformonetarypolicy)to
mimic the allocative role of unenforceable contingent claims.
What we argue below, however, is that the policy recommen-
dations our theory would endorse differ substantially from
those derived from either the textbook-style theory or the
liquidity-constraint theory.
Two features of our model are especially relevant to the
current public discussion of policy. First, nonprice rationing
of credit in our model has to do with features of the economic
environmentthat varyoverthe businesscycle. Speciﬁcally,as
thepublicdiscussionenvisions,nonpricerationingofthemost
solvent credit market participants occurs when aggregate in-
vestment is depressed.6 Second, we model the provision of ﬁ-
nancialintermediationtotraderswhodonotpossessaproduc-
tion technology, rather than to ﬁrms. In this respect, our
model is not fully adequate to address the issue of credit allo-
cation to ﬁrms that is the focus of current public discussion.
The general points made here are certainly also applicable to
credit allocationto ﬁrms,though, and westrongly believethat
our speciﬁc results will have close analogues in a model of
intermediation of ﬁrms’ investment.
A Simple Efficient Exchange Model
Next, we will present a simple model of an economy. This
model emphasizes an explicit representation of economicagents’privateinformation.Becauseofprivateinformationin
themodel,decentralizedtradingofdebtsecuritiesisnotanef-
ﬁcient ﬁnancial arrangement. Rather, the efficient arrange-
ment has features that seem to resemble what some people
currently identify as a “credit crunch.” One of these features,
the nonprice rationing of the most solvent credit market par-
ticipants, occurs speciﬁcally when aggregate investment is at
its lowest possible level (which we take to represent a reces-
sionary situationin themodel). Sincethe arrangementthat we
characterizeinthemodelisefficient,though,weconcludethat
the observation of nonprice credit rationing during recessions
is not necessarily a symptom of inefficiency in the actual
economy.
In our model economy, all traders will be identical ex ante,
buttraderswillsubsequentlyacquireprivateinformationabout
their own endowments. We ﬁrst show an arrangement which
includesthe provisionofexplicitinsurancethatwouldbeeffi-
cient in this economy if information were public; however,
this arrangement is infeasible because of the privacy of in-
formation. Second, we will show that a market for debt se-
curities is feasible despite the privacy of information and that
the allocation determined by such a credit market provides a
higher level of welfare than traders would receive in autarky.
Third, we will show that another allocation can provide an
even higher level of welfare than the debt-securities alloca-
tion. We interpret this allocation as the outcome of a contract
that households can make with a welfare-maximizing inter-
mediary, and later we will describe a notion of competitive
proﬁt maximization which entails that intermediaries should
behave as though they are maximizing welfare.
Our model depicts an economy in which traders consume
goods at two dates and in which they have private informa-
tion about their endowments at the ﬁrst of these dates but not
at the second. Before describing this model formally, we give
two examples of the kind of situation in the actual economy
that the model is supposed to reﬂect. In thinking about the re-
lationship of our formal model to the actual economy, the ﬁrst
consumption date (date 1) in the model should be understood
to describe the trader’s situation within the horizon of a typi-
cal bank loan or other ﬁnancial contract. The second con-
sumption date (date 2) should be understood to describe the
longer-term future.
For example, the owner of a ﬁrm may know that the ﬁrm
currently has a better product than its competitors have and
that the ﬁrm will be able to exploit this advantage, if invest-
ment can be ﬁnanced. Given that special expertise is needed
to recognize which product is the best one, the owner might
be unable to document this knowledge convincingly to a
banker who lacks this expertise. If technical progress in the
industry is rapid enough to allow any ﬁrm to leapfrog the cur-
rent industry leader, then the owner will also not be conﬁdent
that the ﬁrm will still have the best product in the future. That
is, the owner may have important private information regard-
ing the ﬁrm’s short-term prospects, but not regarding its long-
er-term prospects.A parallel example isthat a worker mayre-
ceive reliable but informal (and hence unveriﬁable) advice
that a promotion and salary increase will soon be announced,
but that worker would not have private information regarding
the likelihood of further promotions to take place in several
years’ time. Although these examples cannot be represented
literally in our model of an exchange economy, they illustrate
the way in which the information structure of the economy is
to be interpreted.
The Model
Now we describe the formal model. Consider a world in
which there are three dates: 0, 1, and 2. No production or con-
sumption takes place at date 0—we will discuss in a moment
what happens at that date. There is one good that can be con-
sumed at date 1 and one good that can be consumed at date
2. Call these good 1 and good 2 respectively. (The goods may
be identical except for the date when they are available for
consumption.) There is a linear technology that can transform
an amount x of good 1 into an amount Rx of good 2.
There are many traders (who might also be thought of as
households) in the economy. These traders all have identical
preferences, but they receive different endowments from one
another. Speciﬁcally, there are n classes of traders, and for
each i ≤ n a proportion πi of traders receives endowment yi at
date 1 and endowment z at date 2. (Note that all traders have
the same endowment at date 2, and assume that y1 < ... < yn.)
Assume also that the utility function is of the form u(c1,c2)=
w(c1)+v(c2), where w and v are strictly increasing, strictly
concave functions deﬁned on the nonnegative real numbers
anddifferentiableateverypositiverealnumber.Atradermust
consume a nonnegative amount of each of the two goods.
At date 0, a trader (or household) does not yet know what
its endowment will be. Since it is just like every other trader
at date 0, it assumes that its probability of receiving any en-
dowment level yi at date 1 is πi. From the perspective of date
0, a consumption bundle consists of an amount of good 1 and
an amount of good 2 contingent on each endowment realiza-
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At date 1, each trader will receive its own endowment of
good 1 but will be unable to observe the endowments of other
traders—norwilltraders’endowmentsofgood1subsequently
be veriﬁable to other traders at date 2. In what follows, the
distinctionbetweencommunicationaboutendowmentsanddi-
rect veriﬁcation of endowments is crucial. Assume that each
trader can make a public report of its endowment at date 1,
but that no one else can verify directly whether this report is
truthful.Communicationcanalsooccuratdate0.Atthisdate,
traders can negotiate binding contracts with one another to
share their goods available for consumption at the subsequent
dates.Bynegotiatingsuchconsumption-sharingcontractswith
a large number of its counterparts, a trader can completely
diversify the idiosyncratic risk of its own endowment. How-
ever,the traders’abilitytocontract withoneanother islimited
by the impossibility of direct veriﬁcation just discussed. Trad-
ers can make binding contracts to share their consumption on
the basis of reports made to one another regarding their en-
dowments, but they have no way to check whether other trad-
ers’ reports are truthful. Thus, contracts need to be designed
in such a way that no one can gain anything from misrepre-
sentation.
Four Allocations
In this exchange economy, one of the primary reasons for
trade would be to provide insurance against the randomness
in individual endowments. We will consider four allocations
inthiseconomy:theendowment,thefull-insuranceallocation,
theexpostefficientallocationresultingfromcompetitivetrade
of a debt security at date 1, and the ex ante efficient allocation
that we will characterize in terms of a contract that traders
could make with one another at date 0.7 These four alloca-
tions are depicted in the ﬁgure in the box, which shows an
economy in which there are two levels, y1 and y2, of endow-
ment of good 1.
At date 0, all of the traders would like to pool, invest, and
redistribute their resources so that each trader will consume
a bundle c
→ that solves this problem: maximize u ¯(c
→) subjectto the constraints of nonnegativity (that is, for all i, c1i ≥0 and
c2i ≥ 0) and aggregate feasibility (that is,
n





i=1πiyi). Let us consider a special
case that v(·) = R
−1w(·). It is easy to show that this optimiza-
tion problem is solved by setting c1i = c2i = z for all i. That is,
the solution is essentially to provide full insurance to traders
at date 1. When this has been done, nothing is gained by
using the intertemporal-transformation technology to convert
consumption at date 1 to consumption at date 2.
Thisfull-insurance allocationwould beachieved byacon-
tract that requires each trader to report truthfully its endow-
ment and that transfers to each trader the difference between
zand its reported endowment. After having become parties to
this contract at date 0, though, traders would not report truth-
fully at date 1. Rather, each trader would claim to have the
lowest possible endowment (that is, y1) in order to get the
maximumindemnityfromtheinsurancecontract.Traderswill
prevaricateinthiswaybecausetheintermediarycannotcheck
their reports directly. Given that the underreporting of endow-
ments will occur, it will not be feasible to make the positive
transfers to all traders that are promised in response to their
messages.
Instead of an insurance market, now consider a market for
debt securities that pays gross interest R between dates 1 and
2. Since R is also the traders’ rate of pure time preference,
each trader would want to consume equal amounts at the two
dates if such a security were traded at date 1. That is, each





−1)). That is, each trader is
consuming the optimal bundle in its budget set where the
price of good 1 is 1 and the price of good 2 is R
−1.
Thisdebt-securitiesequilibriumcouldalsobeexpressedin
terms of net trades. A trader may receive any net trade that
has zero value at the price vector (1,R
−1) and that provides a
nonnegative consumption of each good when it is added to
thetrader’sendowment.Notrader’schoiceofnettradewould
be both feasible for another trader and also strictly preferred
by that trader to its own choice, since both net trades have ze-
ro value. That is, although traders’ information about their en-
dowments is private, traders do not attempt to claim the net
trades intended for other traders who have different endow-
ments. Unlikethefull-insurance allocation,thedebt-securities-
equilibriumallocationisincentivecompatibleinthesensethat
traders do not strategically exploit the privacy of their infor-
mation.
Generally (that is, unless yi = z for some wealth level i)
each trader strictly prefers its debt-securities-equilibrium con-
sumption bundle to its endowment ex post. Since this is true
regardless of the amount of endowment that will be realized,
eachtraderalsohasthispreferenceexante.Althoughthewel-
fare gains from participation in the debt-securities market are
not as large as what would be possible through full insurance
ifendowmentinformationwerepublic,thisarrangement does
afford some improvement over autarky.
Economists have devoted much attention to the question
of whether households’ actual allocations conform to the pat-
tern suggested by the debt-securities-equilibrium allocation.8
The apparent intent of their work is to draw some welfare
conclusion regarding the situation of households in the credit
market, using the debt-securities-equilibrium allocation as a
benchmark. This benchmark would not be a sensible one if
informationabouthouseholds’endowments(or,perhapsmore
realistically, information about their employment opportuni-
ties) were public. In that case, an allocation in which full in-
surance is provided would be the appropriate benchmark.
Given that full insurance is infeasible in the presence of pri-
vate information and that a debt-securities market is feasible
and affords some improvement over autarky, there is a prima
facie case that the debt-securities-equilibriumallocation would
be an appropriate benchmark if we take seriously the privacy
ofhouseholds’information.Thatis,theallocationisanappro-
priate benchmark if it solves the problem of maximizing trad-
ers’ ex ante expected utility subject to both the technological
constraints and the constraint of incentive compatibility in the
economy with private information.
Closer inspection reveals, though, that the debt-securities-
equilibriumallocationisgenerallynotthesolutiontothiscon-
strained-optimization problem. To see why not, consider the
typical case in which each trader consumes a strictly positive
amountofgood1inthedebt-securities-equilibriumallocation.
We have already argued that each trader strictly prefers its
own net trade to that of a trader with any other endowment.
By the continuity of the utility function, we could perturb
thesenettradesslightlywithoutviolatingthisstrictpreference.
In particular, we could impose a small tax on the purchase of
debt securities and we could redistribute the proceeds from
this tax to the issuers of debt securities. If the tax were suffi-
ciently small, incentive compatibility would not be violated.
Since traders with large endowments purchase debt securities
and traders with small endowments issue debt securities, this
tax transfer scheme would in effect provide partial insurance
againsthavingalowendowment.Traderswanttoinsurethem-
selves ex ante, so the tax transfer scheme will raise ex ante
expectedutilitywithoutviolatingtechnical-feasibilityorincen-
tive-compatibility constraints.
The upshot is that, contrary to what economists who study
credit markets have often seemed to assume, an allocation
which deviates systematically from the debt-securities equi-
librium may in fact be superior to the equilibrium from an ex
ante perspective. In particular, such a deviation does not nec-
essarily imply that it would be desirable to regulate interme-
diaries in order to impose the debt-securities equilibrium. In
Green and Oh 1991, we formulate and analyze in detail the
constrained-optimizationproblemthatweareconsideringhere.
We also examine how the efficient allocation can potentially
bedistinguishedfromvariousinefficientliquidity-constrained
allocations that have been proposed to explain apparent sys-
tematic deviations of households’ consumption from the pat-
tern that debt-securities equilibrium would entail.9
Competitive Intermediation Via Contracts
We have been discussing what sort of allocation might be ar-
ranged by a benevolent social planner who is constrained to
treat traders according to their unveriﬁable (and unfalsiﬁable)
reports of their endowments. In the actual economy, though,
credit allocation is the outcome of competition among inter-
mediary ﬁrms rather than the outcome of a benevolent plan-
ner’s decision. Thus, we need to relate the foregoing discus-
sion to a notion of competition among intermediaries.
In a Walrasian economy where all information would be
public,theFirstWelfareTheoremimpliesthatthecompetitive
allocation is one solution of the social planner’s problem of
Pareto-efficient allocation. Green (1987) has proved a related
resultregardingoneparametric,inﬁnite-horizonversionofthe
economystudiedhere,andOhandGreen(forthcoming)prove
it in exactly the present context. If intermediaries compete
with one another to offer incentive-compatible contracts for
state-contingent net trades, then the unique contract that will
be offered in equilibrium is the contract that maximizes ex
anteexpectedutilitysubjecttotheconstraintsoftechnicalfea-
sibility and incentive compatibility.
Here is the notion of equilibrium to which this result
refers. At least two intermediaries offer contracts at date 0. A
contract speciﬁes net trades of good 1 and good 2 to be made
on the basis of a trader’s reported endowment. Thus, a con-
tract can be represented as a vector Γ =( γ11,...,γ1n,γ21,...,γ2n),where γti denotes the promised net trade in good t if endow-
ment yi of good 1 is reported. (The subscript i ranges over n
possibleincomelevels.)Noteinparticularthatifatradergives
a truthful report, then γ1i = c1i − yi and γ2i = c2i − z. A contract




−1γ2i] ≤ 0 and
n
i=1πiγ2i ≥ 0) and incen-
tive compatible (that is, for all i and j, u(yi+γ1i,z +γ2i) ≥




i=1πiu(yi,z)). In terms of the numer-




−1γ2i]. This proﬁt is the negative of the net
value of the goods that the intermediary gives to traders. If
traders report truthfully, then nonnegativity of proﬁt is
equivalenttoatechnicalfeasibilityconstraint.Ifwedeﬁne the
state-contingent endowment vector ω
→ =( y1,...,yn,z,...,z), then
a trader’s ex ante expected utility from participating in Γ is
U(Γ)=u ¯(ω
→+Γ).
An intermediary who offers no contract earns zero proﬁt.
Suppose that u
+ is the maximum of the utility levels provided
by the contracts offered by the competitors of some interme-
diary. In order to attract traders away from competitors, that
intermediarymustofferacontractwhichprovidesutilitylevel
strictly higher than u
+. A way to do this is to design a more
cost-effective contract than competitors offer, that is, one that
provides utility level u
+ at lower cost (and thus higher proﬁt
per trader) than the contracts offered by competitors. Then,
modify this contract by giving a small part of the cost saving
to the traders in a way that does not spoil the incentive-com-
patibility of the contract. The modiﬁed contract will provide
a utility level strictly higher than u
+, since it provides this




ing to a contract that is as cost effective as possible. At this
point,intermediariesmustcompetewithoneanotherbyoffer-
ing transfers to traders out of their own proﬁts. This bids
proﬁts down to zero. When an intermediary offers a cost-ef-
fective contract Γ* that yields zero proﬁt, then no one else
can bid traders away without having a negative proﬁt.
Thisinformaldescriptionofcompetitionamongintermedi-
aries suggests the following deﬁnition. A contract Γ*i sa n
equilibrium contract if there is no contract Γ satisfying both
U(Γ) ≥ U(Γ*) and −
n
i=1πi[γ1i + R
−1γ2i] ≥ 0, with at least one
strict inequality.
We want to show that an equilibrium contract is always
efficient. Suppose that the equilibrium contract Γ* were not
efficient.ThentherewouldbeanotherfeasiblecontractΓ′that
provides strictly higher ex ante expected utility than Γ* pro-
vides. This contract could be modiﬁed by taking away a tiny
amount from traders in a way that does not spoil incentive
compatibility. The resulting contract Γ″ would still provide
strictlyhigherexanteexpectedutilitythandoesΓ*andwould
yield strictly higher proﬁt than does Γ′. Recall that the techni-
cal-feasibility condition
n
i=1πi[γ′ 1i + R
−1γ′ 2i] ≤ 0 is equivalent
to the nonnegativity of proﬁt for Γ′,s oΓ″ earns strictly posi-
tive proﬁt. This contradicts the assumption that Γ* was an
equilibrium contract.
Thus, we have established that intermediaries earn zero
proﬁt in equilibrium and that the equilibrium contract is effi-
cient. For more formal versions of this argument, see Green
1987 and Oh and Green, forthcoming. The argument can be
modiﬁed straightforwardly to show that a proﬁt-maximizing
monopolistic intermediary would maximize traders’ ex ante
expected utility subject to achieving the monopoly proﬁt lev-
el. That is, the monopolist would extract rents from traders
but would still offer them the same kind of insurance arrange-
ment that the competitive contract provides. (We will appeal
to this fact in the Appendix of the paper.)
A noteworthy aspect of this argument is its dependence on
theassumptionthattradersirrevocablybindthemselvesatdate
0 to make contractually speciﬁed net trades with the interme-
diary at dates 1 and 2. Because the efficient contract provides
endowment insurance to some extent, traders who receive
high endowments must earn less than R, the marginal rate of
intertemporal transformation, on the deposit of good 1 that
they are required to make with the intermediary. After having
learned that their endowments are high, these traders would
like to default on the contract and invest their endowments di-
rectlyintheintertemporal-transformationtechnology(orrene-
gotiate a contract with an intermediary who will provide the
same rate of return as that technology) ex post. Such default
is assumed not to be possible in the model economy. In the
actual economy, though, long-term contracts for ﬁnancial in-
termediation do not seem to be so completely immune from
default. This distinction between the actual economy and the
model economy will be crucial to the following discussion of
ﬁnancial intermediation.
Numerical Solution of the Model
In this section, we will show that nonprice rationing is a more
efficient way than price adjustment to provide insurance in an
economy of privately informed traders. We will also show
that it is speciﬁcally when the nonnegativity constraint on ag-
gregate investment is binding (a situation that is most closely
approximatedduringrecessionsintheactualeconomy),rather
than in other unforseen contingencies, that nonprice rationing
is incident on consumers at the highest endowment level.
Our argument relies heavily on numerical solution of the
model presented in the efficient exchange part of this paper.
Ideally, we would like to have a genuine time-series model to
study the relationship of intermediation to macroeconomic
events, but we do not have such a model.10 Provisionally,
then, we study the three-date model (that is, with a contract-





ing to what happens when it is not binding, in order to get a
rough idea of how the efficient allocation is affected by
recession.11 We focus here on the investment constraint as a
proxyforrecessionbecauseintheactualeconomyinvestment
is much more volatile than consumption. Speciﬁcally, during
recessions investment tends to be heavily reduced in signiﬁ-
cant sectors of the economy.12
Comparingnumericalsolutionsofourthree-datemodelfor
parameter values where the constraint is binding with solu-
tions for parameter values where it is not binding shows the
effects of abinding nonnegativity constrainton investment.A
typical solution where the nonnegativity constraint does not
bind is shown in Figure 1.13 There are ﬁve levels of endow-
ment of good 1: 1.0, 1.5, 3.0, 4.5, and 5.0. One-ﬁfth of house-
holds receive each of these endowments. All households are
endowed with 2.5 units of good 2. In the ﬁgure, the horizon-
tal axis represents good 1 and the vertical axis represents
good 2. The endowments in the economy are represented by
thepointson thehorizontal line.The debt-securities-equilibri-
um consumption bundles of traders with the ﬁve different en-
dowments are shown by points on the diagonal line. (The
third point from the top right is not one of these.) The con-
sumptionbundlesassignedtothecorrespondingtradersbythe
efficient allocation are the four points on the southeast side of
the diagonal line and the second point from the top right on
the diagonal line itself.Because these four pointsdo not lieon
the wealth-expansion path of traders’ demand for the debt se-
curity (that is, the diagonal line), the consumption of traders
at all but the highest endowment level must be determined in
part by nonprice rationing. Note especially that the consump-tion bundles of traders at the lowest two endowment levels
provide virtually the same amount of consumption at date 2,
and the difference in date 1 consumption between the two
households is virtually the same as the difference between
their endowments of good 1. That is, the marginal propensity
to consume from date 1 endowment (that is, income) is very
close to unity.14
AsHayashi(1987)notes,macroeconomistshavetendedto
infer the presence of inefficient “liquidity constraints” from
high marginal propensity to consume. Speciﬁcally, macro-
economists have also tended to suggest that the households in
the actual economy which display high marginal propensity
to consume are worse off than they would be if they could
trade on a debt-securities market. The results shown in Figure
1 do not support that conclusion, though. Note that traders
with the two lowest levels of endowment receive more of
good 1 in the efficient allocation than they receive in the debt-
securities-market equilibrium allocation, but they receive es-
sentially the same amount of good 2 in both allocations.
Clearly,theyarereceivingsomesubsidy(fromanexpostper-
spective) in the efficient allocation relative to the debt-securi-
ties-market equilibrium allocation. From an ex ante perspec-
tive, we would interpret this subsidy to be an insurance in-
demnity provided through intermediation.
In contrast to other traders in the efficient allocation, the
highest endowment traders have a consumption bundle that is
on the income-expansion path for the debt-securities market
because the efficient allocation speciﬁes that their marginal
rateofintertemporalrateofsubstitutionshouldbeequaltothe
economy’s marginal rate of intertemporal transformation.
Thesehighestendowmenthouseholdsneverface nonpricera-
tioningexceptwhenthenonnegativityconstraintonaggregate
investment is binding at the efficient allocation.
Figure 2 shows an economy just like the previous one,
except that all traders are endowed with three units of good
2. At the efficient allocation in this economy, the nonnegativ-
ity constraint on investment is binding. The efficient alloca-
tion in Figure 2 differs from that in Figure 1 in the important
respect that households with the highest endowment level
consume substantially less of good 1, but very little more of
good 2, in the efficient allocation than they consume in the
debt-securities-marketequilibriumallocation.Fromanexpost
perspective, these households with high endowment at date 1
are subject to nonprice rationing at date 1.
To summarize, our numerical analysis supports two main
results. First, it shows that a cross-sectional pattern of high
marginal propensity to consume out of current endowment
(that is, income) is consistent with efficient allocation and in
factisconsistentwiththehouseholdsthatexhibithighmargin-
al propensity to consume being better off than they would be
ina debt-securities-marketequilibrium. Second,ournumerical
analysis shows that an allocation can be ex ante efficient de-
spite the nonprice rationing of high-endowment traders that
may occur when the investment constraint is binding.
How the Model Relates to an Actual Economy
The research we have presented here concerns ex ante effi-
cientallocationsachievablebycontractsforﬁnancialinterme-
diation in an economy with privately informed agents. Our
researchsupports threemainconclusionsdrawnfromthespe-
ciﬁc model of a private information economy we studied.
First,efficientallocationscanhavefeaturespreviouslythought
to indicate the occurrence of inefficient credit rationing. Sec-
ond, competition in the provision of intermediation contracts
will lead to the provision of an efficient contract if long-term
contractual obligations are enforceable. Third, if restrictions
on the enforceability of long-term contracts exist (as in the
actual economy), then some forms of regulatory intervention
traditionallycriticizedbyeconomistsmayimprovewelfareby
constrainingcontingentclaimstobehonoredthatcouldnotbe
enforced directly; conversely, to the extent that the efficient
long-term contract does characterize the actual allocation of
resources, policies formulated with a full-information econo-
my in mind may reduce welfare in the actual economy.
Although the above conclusions are derived from a sche-
matic model, they are relevant to current discussion of actual
economic conditions and policy. That is, in the context of our
model, the phenomena about which people complain in terms
of a “credit crunch” are actually consistent with economic ef-
ﬁciency. Thus, without a speciﬁc alternative model in which
policyinterventionisshowntodosomegood,thereshouldbe
no rush to implement presumed policy remedies.
A possible rejoinder to this position would be that actual
credit transactions do not have the rich contractual form that
our model posits. The intermediaries with which households
and relatively small ﬁrms deal are banks, S&Ls, and other
ﬁrms that nominally provide only a limited range of interme-
diation services: issuing credit and taking savings deposits.
Based on what these intermediaries ostensiblydo, it is notim-
mediately evident that the contracts they write have the insur-
ance aspect which our theory predicts. Rather, the actual con-
tracts seem to be very closely related to debt securities that
are held by the intermediary rather than being traded.
We argue that, despite this superﬁcial appearance, con-
tractsintheactualeconomyaremorecontingentdefactothan
theirexplicitprovisionsindicate.Webelievethatthemostim-
portant contingencies have to do with macroeconomic reces-
sions. When a severe recession takes place, borrowers in es-
pecially hard hit sectors of the economy obtain some reduc-
tion in the burden of their debt. Because this relief must be
offered by an intermediary which had expected to make zero
proﬁt in competitive equilibrium, the intermediary is unable
to meet all of its commitments to its customers. In various
ways, customers who are relatively lightly affected by the re-
cession tend to be rationed. These lightly affected customers




rationing of high-endowment traders that occurs in the effi-
cient allocation depicted in Figure 2.
In the Appendix, we summarize three pieces of historical
evidenceontheperformanceoftheU.S.ﬁnancial-intermedia-
tion industry during severe recessions. This evidence is frag-
mentary and impressionistic, but it seems to conform to the
pattern we have just described. An important aspect of this
evidence is the prominence of legislative and regulatory inter-
ventioninformsthat,fromanexpostperspective,seeminim-
ical to welfare. From an ex ante perspective, though, some
such interventions are welfare-enhancing. When nonprice ra-
tioningabrogatesexplicitcontractualpromisesthatweremade
withnormaleconomicconditionsinmind,theinvolvementof
the monetary authority or of ﬁnancial regulators is necessary
to facilitate it. The resulting combination of debt relief for the
heavily affected customers of the intermediary and nonprice
rationing for the lightly affected customers is tantamount to
the kind of insurance our theoretical analysis predicts. It is
noteworthy that such a combination of debt relief and ration-
ingiswhatsomeobservers,viewingthecurrentU.S.econom-
ic situation from an ex post perspective, are calling a “credit
crunch.”Appendix
Three Intermediation Episodes During Severe Recessions
What follows is an exploration of three historical episodes of inter-
mediation during severe recessions that seem to support the theory
presented in the preceding paper.
1838
The ﬁrst of these episodes concerns the activities of the ﬁnancier
Nicholas Biddle during 1838 (McGrane 1924, pp. 193–205). He
was clearly one of the dominant bankers in the United States and
presumably had considerable market power. Biddle had been the
largest shareholder of the Second Bank of the United States, and
when its federal charter expired, he obtained a Pennsylvania charter
for the bank. This bank apparently had a cost advantage over its
competitors in the South and West that presumably conferred close
to monopoly power in the cotton-growing regions of the United
States.1 The relevance of this supposition is that a monopolist might
well be better able than a competitive intermediary to enforce the
efficient long-term contract.2
In fact, Biddle did take actions that were tantamount to provid-
ing insurance to his bank’s customers, particularly to the cotton
growers. In 1838, and again in 1839, Biddle and his associates en-
tered the market as go-betweens, taking legal possession of baled
cotton from heavily indebted growers who would normally have re-
lied on credit to ﬁnance shipment of their crops to England and oth-
er markets.3 By taking these speculative positions, Biddle and his
associates did two things. They both transferred their customers’
risks to themselves and also undertook the transportation and mar-
keting investment that these customers would not otherwise have
been able to ﬁnance because they were too heavily indebted to be
offered further credit.
In the spring of 1838, Biddle was also resisting pressure for the
resumption of specie payment after a suspension of many months.
He cited the fact that resumption at that point would have caused
difficulties for Southern and Western farmers as one reason for his
resistance. Thus, Biddle was offering substantial help to customers
to whom he was not contractually obligated, who would have been
poorcandidatesforsuchhelpaccordingtonormalbankingpractices,
and whose weak ﬁnancial position as a group was attributable to
their being particularly hard hit by a macroeconomic recession that
had less serious effects elsewhere in the country.
Let us interpret this episode explicitly in terms of our theory.
NicholasBiddlemighthaverestrictedhisbusinesswithcottongrow-
ers to the making of loans on an annual cycle to ﬁnance the grow-
ing and marketing of the crop. In years when growers experienced
difficulty in repaying these loans, he could have forced them to re-
pay these loans despite the hardship (presumably including the sale
at auction of plantations which collateralized the loans) that this pol-
icy would have entailed for them. Suppose that the annual cost of
funding these loans would have been C for Biddle and C′ > C for
his competitors. Thus, Biddle could have made an annual proﬁt of
C′ − C from such a straightforward lending business. (That is, he
would have charged his competitors’ cost of funds as his interest
rate. If a competitor were to enter the market, Biddle could have re-
duced his interest rate below C′ and driven the competitor out, al-
though Biddle himself would have continued to break even.)
However, suppose instead that a recession occurred on average
every nyears, and Biddle were to make and to honor a commitment
to his client cotton growers that he would give them an amount M
of debt relief. In particular, suppose he agreed to purchase their
crops at a favorable price and assume the cost and the risk of mar-
keting them. Suppose also that the growers were willing to pay a
premium P > M/n for this commitment, which amounts to an in-
formal or implicit insurance contract.4Then Biddle’sexpected proﬁt
in a year would be (C′−C)+( P−M/n)>C′ − C. That is, he would
continue to make the same proﬁt as before on his lending business
and he would also conduct an insurance business that would be
proﬁtable on average. In years when the informal insurance com-
mitment speciﬁed that Biddle should offer debt relief, short-term
proﬁt maximization would dictatethat he should not honor the com-
mitment. However, if he were to make that decision, his subsequent
promises to provide insurance would not be credible, so his annual
proﬁt in the future would be reduced to what he could achieve by
lending alone. If he faced competition from other intermediaries
whose costs were as low as his own, then competition would drive
Biddle’s annual proﬁt to zero in any event. He would thus have no
incentive to override his short-term inclination not to honor his
promise ofrelief. Becauseof hiscost advantage,though, Biddlewas
assured of an enhanced stream of future proﬁts if he did honor his
commitment. That is, Biddle’s dominant competitive position made
it more proﬁtable for him to offer an efficient long-term contract
from whichhe demandeda stream of rentsex antethan tomaximize
short-term proﬁts ex post at the expense of his steady customers.
1819–21
A secondhistorical episode,thetwo-year-long depressionfollowing
the Panic of 1819, shows the role of public intervention in approx-
imating an efficient-contract allocation when unenforceability of
implicit long-term agreements prevents decentralized competition
among intermediaries from achieving efficiency (Rothbard 1962).
Again, we will ﬁrst summarize the historical situation and then ex-
plain how our theory bears on this evidence.
The 1819–21 depression was marked by a monetary contraction
and deﬂation that greatly increased the burden of nominal debts. In
response to this situation, a number of states passed stay laws and
minimum assessment laws. In principle, a stay law speciﬁed only
that a period of time had to pass after a debt became due before
legal action could be taken to collect it. However, states actually
passed laws that made the length of a stay depend on the type of as-
set that the creditor required for payment. A typical law would pro-
vide that a creditor could collect quickly if the creditor were willing
to accept bank notes at face value, but that collection proceedings
against the borrower would be stayed for a long time if the creditor
insisted on being paid in specie (that is, in coin). In many cases, the
effect of such a provision would be to induce the creditor to settle
for payment in bank notes with a market value substantially below
their face value in order to receive any payment at all within a rea-
sonable period of time.
Suppose, for example, that a borrower owed $100 to a creditor.
The borrower might offer the creditor payment in notes issued by
a bank of dubious soundness whose notes were being traded at half
their face value. If the creditor needed funds quickly, this offer
would be accepted because otherwise there would be an inordinate-
ly long stay in collection of the debt. When the offer of repayment
in bank notes was accepted, the borrower would purchase bank
notes of face value totaling $100 for $50 in specie and would give
them to the creditor who would immediately sell them to someone
else for $50 in specie. If the debt had been contracted on the implic-
it understanding that payment would be made in specie, then this re-
payment arrangement was tantamount to the creditor providing $50
of debt forgiveness to the borrower in return for quick repayment.
From an ex post perspective, the effect of the stay law appears
to have been to abrogate the intended debt contract. From an ex
ante perspective, though, both borrower and lender must have rec-
ognized that such a law was a likely legislative outcome in the
event of a severe recession. Thus when they made their contract,
both borrower and lender understood that debt relief would be pro-
vided if there were a recession. The cost of this contingency to the
creditor was presumably taken into account in setting the interest
rate on the loan. From an ex ante perspective, then, negotiating a
debt contract in an institutional setting that would generate a stay
law if there were a recession (so that the debt contract had an im-
plicit contingency clause) was Pareto superior to negotiating a truly
noncontingent debt contract.
The other common way states responded to this depression was
by instituting minimum assessment laws. A minimum assessment
law stated that assets seized in case of default had to be accounted
at an assessed value rather than at their market value in determining
satisfaction of the debt. These laws tended to specify assessment
mechanismsthatwereheavilybiasedinfavorof thedefaultingdebt-
ors. Again, the effect of the law was to permit the satisfaction of
debts at considerably less than their contractually speciﬁed values
in market terms.
One might suppose that these legislative interferences with the
conduct of credit markets should be explained in terms of inefficient
political institutions rather than in terms of efficient economic insti-tutions. The obvious political explanation would be that the depres-
sioncreatedapowerfulconstituencyofdebtorswholobbiedsuccess-
fully for relief. Two considerations cast doubt on such an explana-
tion,though.Theﬁrstconsiderationisthedemographiccomposition
of support for debtor relief. The debtors themselves were presum-
ably a fairly small proportion of the population. An important class
of these debtors, those who had earlier purchased federal land on
credit, includedboth smallWestern farmersand wealthyspeculators
from Eastern cities. These debtors were not concentrated in any
particular state or group of states; thus, they did not constitute a
powerfulcoalition bythemselves withinany state.Indeed, Rothbard
(1962) emphasizes that the debates over debtor relief generally cut
across established political coalitions.
The second consideration against a political inefficiency expla-
nation of debtor-relief legislation is that such legislation was already
on the books in some states before 1819, and similar legislation was
passed subsequently in the Panic of 1837 (McGrane 1924, p. 137).
So although a debtors’ lobby would have been only occasionally
and temporarily inﬂuential (that is, during recessions), debtor-relief
legislation seems to have been an established response to recession
in the aftermath of deﬂation. It is more difficult to accept inefficient
political equilibrium as an explanation of such a systematic policy
than it would be as an explanation of a onetime rent-seeking experi-
ment imposed by a minority coalition on an unprepared or unsus-
pecting majority.
Our theory provides a more satisfactory explanation of the kinds
of debt relief that were legislatively enacted after the Panic of 1819
thandoestheexplanationofpoliticallyinefficientrentseekingalone.
The transfers to which the various legislative measures led are qual-
itatively similar to the ex ante efficient allocation in our model.
Agents in the economy held portfolios containing varying amounts
of nominally denominated assets and liabilities. An intermediary
would not necessarily be fully informed about how much of an
agent’s portfolio was exposed to price-level risk. For example, hold-
ings of bonds issued by governments or by railroad and canal com-
panies and debt owed directly to the federal government through
purchase of public land on credit would be nominal assets and lia-
bilities respectively which would not be contracted through a bank.
Nor would such portfolio positions be strictly a function of a per-
son’s wealth or other attributes directly observable by a bank. For
example, a wealthy person might either be a large holder of canal
bonds (and hence a beneﬁciary of deﬂation, if the canal in question
remained solvent) or a speculator in the purchase on credit of public
lands (and hence a victim of deﬂation). That is, the extent to which
a person was a beneﬁciary or a victim of deﬂation is the kind of pri-
vate information with which our theory is concerned.
We have characterized the efficient allocation as one in which
the victims of deﬂation would be subsidized (for example, by being
allowed to repay their debts in depreciated assets which would be
accepted by the intermediary at full face value) while the beneﬁcia-
ries would be assessed the cost of this subsidy. However, if any
competitive intermediary were to attempt to implement this alloca-
tion with respect to its customers, the beneﬁciaries of deﬂation
would refuse to pay their assessments. In the absence of public in-
tervention, they could succeed in doing so because the intermediary
was bound to treat them generously by contracts that did not contain
contingencies for the event of severe deﬂation that had come about.
Moreover, to the extent that the efficient allocation would require
the beneﬁciaries of deﬂation to accept a lower-than-market rate of
return on additions to their savings, they could simply refuse to de-
posit new savings with an intermediary that required these terms.
Their business could be bid away by a competing intermediary, or
they could simply invest their savings in nonintermediated assets.
That is, intermediaries in the actual economy could not imple-
ment the efficient allocation because they were in continual compe-
tition (with one another and with providers of nonintermediated as-
sets) for their customers’ business. This form of competition con-
trasts sharply with the form of competition assumed in our theory,
which is ex ante competition to be in a binding, long-term contrac-
tual relationship. However, some of the beneﬁts of ex ante competi-
tion can be obtained by ex post political intervention such as oc-
curred during and after the Panic of 1819. This intervention forced
intermediaries to make the subsidies required by efficiency, with the
cost of these subsidies being borne either by the stockholders of the
bank or (if the amount of the subsidy was sufficiently large or the
bank was thinly capitalized) by its noteholders and depositors.
The allocation resulting from political intervention presumably
fell short of fully achieving efficiency in three respects. First, stay
laws and minimum assessment laws could probably only achieve a
rough approximation of the efficient levels of subsidy to various
persons. Second, the class consisting of stockholders, noteholders,
and depositors of a bank probably coincided only roughly with the
class of persons from whom it would have been efficient to collect
the value of subsidies in order that the intermediary would make
nonnegative proﬁts. Third, implementation of subsidies by political
intervention arguably has large costs (which are the main focus of
textbook-style economic theory criticisms of such intervention) in
terms of resource allocation ex post. Nevertheless, if (for either
goodorbadreasons)long-termcontractsforintermediationrelation-
ships are made unenforceable in a legal system, then such recourse
to ex post political intervention at times of severe economic disloca-
tion may possibly implement the closest feasible approximation to
the efficient allocation.
1980
The third historical episode we want to consider in support of our
theory is a recent one: the imposition of selective credit controls by
the Carter administration in 1980. At that time, unanticipated sharp
increases in the price of petroleum and in the value of the dollar
relative to foreign currencies had recently exacerbated problems in
the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. The inﬂation
rate was also high relative to its levels in recent history, and the ad-
ministration had committed itself to reducing this rate quickly and
substantially. To the extent that borrowers had expected to repay
nominally ﬁxed debts in an inﬂated currency, then, the cessation of
inﬂation would raise their real indebtedness above its anticipated
level. There were three reasons why this would be a problem for
farmers and owners of small businesses that were dependent on in-
termediated credit. First, deﬂation would combine with changes in
the price of oil and the exchange rate to lower their current proﬁts.
Second, this additional negative shock might force some heavily in-
debtedborrowerstodefaultandmightmakeotherborrowersineligi-
bletobeextendedfurthercredit.Third,becausemarketforcesmight
not cause nominal interest rates to fall until after inﬂation were de-
monstrably under control (since nominal interest rates reﬂect sub-
jectively anticipated rates of inﬂation and market participants might
be skeptical of the seriousness or efficacy of the administration’s
plans to lower inﬂation), these borrowers might have to take out
new loans that would have a very high real interest rate, assuming
that inﬂation were successfully brought under control.
If the administration were attempting to adapt credit arrange-
ments to the contingency of a tight-money policy conducted during
a recession, then our analysis suggests that it should attempt to miti-
gate the incidence of these three effects on farm and small business
borrowers. Moreover, our analysis suggests that the burden of its
policy should fall most heavily on classes of credit market partici-
pant that were relatively lightly affected by the macroeconomic
shocks that were affecting the borrowers so seriously. A prime ex-
ample of such a lightly affected class of credit market participants
were ﬁrms and workers in the urban service sector. Because these
people were involved predominantly in domestic trade, the high ex-
change value of the dollar did not affect them as heavily as it af-
fected exporters. Also, petroleum was a less signiﬁcant input to pro-
duction in this sector than it was in heavy industry or in agriculture
(because of agriculture’s reliance on petrochemical fertilizers).
As part of its monetary policy, the administration put into effect
a set of selective credit controls. Prominent among these was a spe-
cial reserve requirement on consumer installment credit. This re-
serve requirement could have been structured in a way that would
have forced some states to relax usury law ceilings that were bind-
ing on such lending, but the opportunity to structure the requirement
in that way was not taken. Credit for automobile and housing pur-
chases—two hard-hit industries in the recession—was exempted
from selective controls.5
Onceagain,theCarteradministration’spolicycanbeunderstood
as an outcome either of an inefficient political process or of an at-
tempt to approximate an ex ante efficient contract in a contingency
for which explicit contractual provisions had not been made in the
market. Schreft (1990) explains clearly why the policy of selectivecredit constraint was inefficient from an ex post perspective. The
fact that ﬁrms and unions in the automobile and construction indus-
tries are powerful lobbies certainly helps to account for the special
treatment of those two industries. It is not necessary to choose be-
tween those two explanations of the policy, though. Selective credit
controls may have been a reasonable attempt to approximate contin-
gencies of an ex ante efficient contract, even though they did not
constituteaperfectapproximation.Therefore,politicalagentswould
ﬁnd it easier to succeed in advocating such a policy than an egre-
giously inefficient one.
The selective credit controls imposed in 1980 can indeed be
viewed as approximating contingencies of an ex ante efficient con-
tract. To a considerable extent, consumer installment credit (for
example, credit card usage) is a convenient means of payment rath-
er than a signiﬁcant part of households’ strategies for the intertem-
poral allocation of their wealth. Since consumer installment credit
was functioning this way, the special reserve requirement against
this form of credit was an inducement to banks to constrain the li-
quidity of their customers who would otherwise draw on their cred-
it. Had the requirement been structured in a way that would have
mitigated state usury law constraints, part of its effect would have
been achieved through price rationing rather than through the non-
price rationing that we have shown should occur. In the case of
credit for automobile purchases and housing construction, the af-
fected forms of credit to consumers were economically equivalent
to the direct provision of ﬁnancing to producers in industries that
were clearly intended to be beneﬁciaries of the policy. Thus, the ex-
emption of these transactions can be viewed as an implementable
(albeitimperfect) wayof targeting thecontrols astightly as possible.
Conclusion
The three episodes considered here typify a pattern of legislative or
regulatory interference in credit markets that clearly departs from
laissez-faire treatment of a market for debt securities. We have ar-
gued that such interference might be consistent with an attempt ex
post to approximate an ex ante efficient contract when an unfore-
seen contingency arises. A common feature of the examples dis-
cussedhereisthatlegislativeorregulatoryinterventionhasoccurred
duringsevererecessionsordepressions.Webelievethatthepolitical
system may be particularly prone to generating such outcomes dur-
ing macroeconomic recessions. The results presented earlier in the
paper explain this pattern in the following sense. When contracts
that would govern long-term intermediation relationships are not
completely enforceable (as in the actual economy), then the equilib-
rium of decentralized competition among intermediaries may close-
ly resemble equilibrium in debt-securities markets. Legislative or
regulatory intervention can have the effect of partially substituting
for long-term contractual promises (which cannot always be en-
forced in the actual economy) in moving the economy towards the
exanteefficientallocation.Thisperspectiveonpoliticalintervention
may help to explain why, although intervention has occurred many
times in the history of the U.S. economy and has been recognized
as being inefficient from an ex post perspective, there has been rela-
tively little enthusiasm for systematic reforms that would limit its
future scope.
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1Throughoutthepaperwewillusetheterms textbook-style andliquidity-constraint
to refer to these two models, which we will describe in more detail below. Hayashi
(1987) also has a discussion that makes clear the logical structure of these two theories.
Weadopttheliquidity-constraint terminologyonlybecauseithasbeenusedbyHayashi
and by other proponents and expositors of the second theory.
2Note, however, that Greenspan(1991a, p. 245) hasminimized the risk of thissitu-
ation for the conduct of monetary policy.
3ChairmanGreenspan’squotedremarksdonotaddressexplicitlytheissueofpossi-
ble regulatory distortion, but there seems to have been supervisory concern about the
imbalanceoflenders’portfolios—speciﬁcally,aboutthedegreeofexposuretothecom-
mercial real estate industry. Richard F. Syron (1991, p. 542), President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, has stated to Congress that “there may have been a shift in
regulatory sentiment about some New England institutions that, while understandable
or even appropriate on a case-by-case basis, may have been perverse for the economy
as a whole.” President Bush and several officials of the executive branch have made
statements blaming overzealous bank supervision for causing a “credit crunch.” (See
Cope and Atkinson 1991, Murray and Duke 1990.)
4Chairman Greenspan (1991c) could be understood as rejecting either of these two
arguments. If his references to “inappropriate caution” and to the absence of “sensible
balance” express reservations about imputing rational expectations to lenders he would
certainly reject the ﬁrst; and if he concurs with President Syron’s (1991, p. 542) worry
(fn. 3) that recent supervisory attitudes or practices may have been inappropriate, he
would certainly reject the second of these textbook-style arguments.
5PresidentSyron(1991,p.540)oftheFederalReserveBankofBostonhasrecently
drawn attention to the costliness of switching intermediaries, but both he and President
Keehn (1991, p. 544) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago have noted that substan-
tial amounts of such switching may quickly occur despite these costs.
6ResearcherssuchasGaleandHellwig(1985),Williamson(1986,1987),andBoyd
and Smith (1991) have formulated other models in which nonprice credit rationing is
as efficient as our model, but neither these models nor the liquidity-constraint models
relatetheoccurrenceofsuchrationingtothemagnitudesofmacroeconomicaggregates.
7In Green and Oh 1991, we have referred to this allocation as the efficient-contract
allocation.
8Hayashi 1987 provides a survey of theoretic and econometric work in this area.
9Whether the data on households’ consumption patterns reﬂect such a deviation
continuestobedebated.SeeChristiano,Eichenbaum,andMarshall1990;Runkle1991;
Keane and Runkle 1991; and Falk and Lee 1990.
10The formulation of, and solution method for, such a model have been developed
in Oh 1991, and the time-series analysis that we envision here is currently in progress.
11Binding consumption constraints for low-income traders can also result in effi-
cient-contract allocations that involve nonprice rationing.
12Alternatively, binding nonnegativity constraints for consumption of low-endow-
ment traders might be taken to characterize recession. The implications would be quali-
tatively the same as those we discuss here.
13This solution is for an economy in which traders have additively separable, con-
stant-relative-risk-aversion utility x
−½ with a discount factor of 0.96 and a marginal rate
ofintertemporaltransformationR=1.04.Thesolutionisobtainedbyconvertingtheop-
timizationproblemdeﬁningtheefficientcontracttoanequivalentconstrainedoptimiza-
tionproblem (describedin Oh andGreen, forthcoming),solving theLagrangian for this
problem, and verifying that the constraint qualiﬁcation condition holds at the solution.
14Our schematic model is not calibrated to parameters of the actual economy. Ex-
amples with different parameters display widely varying levels of the marginal propen-
sity to consume.
1Dewey (1910, p. 200) writes that “the bank adopted a policy of supplementing
bankingfacilitiesinthosesectionswheretherewasweakness.Biddleadmittedthatlarge
amounts of the capital were given to those sections where there was a deﬁciency, be-
cause the production of the great staples seemed to require the most assistance in order
to get them into the market. As Catterall [another economic historian] points out, one
result of the branch system was the supplying of loans to the South and West at a
cheaper rate than could have been possible without them.”
2Amonopolisthasincentivetomaintainareputationforkeepingitsownlong-term
commitments and for dealing severely with customers who renege on their long-term
commitments. Reputation effects are likely to be weak in a competitive market with
many intermediaries, and defaulting customers in such a market may be able to recon-
tract with new intermediaries and thus avoid reprisal for their default.
3It is not clear from McGrane 1924 whether Biddle’s United States Bank accepted
thecottoninsettlementofaccountsorwhetherBiddlehimselfbecameheavilyinvolved
inthecottonmarket.InviewofBiddle’sdirectandclosecontrolofthebank,thedistinc-
tion between these possibilities is immaterial to the point that we are making here.
4Dewey (1910, p. 244) notes that branches of the Bank of the United States had
previously come to the aidof cotton growers in1831–32. This evidence strengthensthe
case that Biddle’s subsequentpolicy was consistent with anongoing insurance relation-
ship. Moreover, one factor in the difficulties of 1831–32 was a cholera outbreak.
Whether the labor force of a particular producer had been lightly or heavily affected by
cholera typiﬁes the kind of information that might not be directly veriﬁable by a lender.
In this respect, our model ﬁts the earlier episode better than it ﬁts the episode that we
have chosen to recount. (It does so on the grounds that the lender’s response is better
documented.)
5Schreft(1990)documentsthesemeasures,butsheinterpretsthemratherdifferently
than we do here.
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An easy way to understand how the four allocations discussed
in the text illustrate our theory is to see them depicted graphical-
ly. The ﬁgure in this box does just that.
The ﬁrst of these four allocations is the endowment. Half of
the traders in the economy receive 1.5 units of the good at date
1, and the other half receive 3.5 units. All traders receive 2 units
of the good at date 2. Thus, there are two endowment points,
(y1, z) = (1.5, 2.0) and (y2, z) = (3.5, 2.0). In the ﬁgure, we label
these points as W1 and W2 respectively.
We assume that 1 unit of the good at date 1 can be trans-
formed to 1.04 units of the good at date 2. In the textbook-style
theory, then, each trader (or household) will have a budget line
that passes through its endowment point and has slope −1.04.
These budget lines are depicted by the straight lines in the ﬁg-
ure. The competitivegross interestrate isthe priceof date-1con-
sumption in terms of date-2 consumption, and this competitive
price must equal the marginal rate of intertemporal transforma-
tion 1.04. At this price, there is an income-expansion path de-
picted by the diagonal dashed line in the ﬁgure. (The path will
be a ray from the origin, as depicted here, if traders have homo-
thetic preferences; however, this feature is not assumed or im-
plied by our theory.) The consumption points for traders in the
second allocation, the debt-securities equilibrium, are the points
where the traders’ budget lines intersect this income-expansion
path. These debt-securities consumption points are labeled DS1
and DS2 in the ﬁgure.
The consumption bundles that traders with the two endow-
ment levels are assigned by the efficient contract are labeled as
EC1 and EC2 in the ﬁgure. This efficient-contract allocation is
the third allocation in the theory. Note that EC2 is also on the
income-expansion path. We argue later in the paper that this is
the typical situation—that high-endowment traders seem to be
optimizing at the competitive interest rate after a lump-sum sub-
traction from their endowments—whenever aggregate invest-
ment is positive.
Through each of the efficient-contract allocation points, we
have drawn the indifference curve of the trader that receives the
corresponding consumption bundle. Note that the net trades of
traders with endowments W1 and W2 are EC1 − W1 and EC2 −
W2 respectively. If a trader with endowment W1 were to claim
to have endowment W2 and were to be given the net trade in-
tended for the other type of trader, then the trader in question
would consume X1 = W1 +( EC2 − W2). This point X1 is below
the indifference curve through EC1, so misrepresentation is not
in the trader’s interest. That is, the efficient-contract allocation
is incentive compatible for traders whose endowment is W1.
Analogously, a trader with endowment W2 would consume bun-
dle X2 = W2 +( EC1 − W1) as a consequence of misrepresenting
itsendowment.Thisconsumptionbundleisonthesameindiffer-
ence curve as is the trader’s intended consumption bundle EC2,
so the trader does not gain from misrepresentation. Again, the
efficient allocation is incentive compatible for traders with this
endowment.
If the allocation were not constrained by incentive compati-
bility, then traders would choose ex ante to have a fourth alloca-
tion,thefull-insuranceallocationFI.Inthisallocation,allhouse-
holds consume identical bundles. Whether a trader receives a
high or low endowment has no effect on what the trader con-
sumes.